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ESTABLISHING RAILROAD LIABILITY FOR FIRES
ELLAHUE A. HARPER
FOWLER VINCENT HARPER
INTRODUCTION
An action against a railroad company for damage caused by
fires started or set out along or near the right-of-way by locomo-
tives raises questions concerning which no little confusion has
crept into the cases. A great deal of the difficulty arises out of a
failure to recognize the theories upon which such actions, under
modern statutes, are brought, and the kind and effect of the vari-
ous presumptions that arise with respect to the issues involved.
Many cases eventually result in erroneous decisions because coun-
sel, failing to invoke the proper presumptions, neglect to demand
such rulings of the judge as they are entitled to under the law.
Juries not infrequently are permitted to return verdicts when,
as a matter of law, the case should never have gone to the jury
in the first place.
In cases which the juries may properly consider, they are
not always to blame for verdicts contrary to the rights of the
litigants. Often causes involving responsibility for railroad fires
hang exclusively upon circumstantial evidence. Erroneous instruc-
tions by the court on the necessary amount and nature of this
kind of evidence sometimes put upon one or the other party a
burden difficult or impossible to sustain and one not at all war-
ranted by law, with the result that the jury may be constrained
to find in a way contrary to that which would* have been per-
missible had accurate instructions been given. Both counsel and
court have gone astray on these phases of such cases, and it is
to them that failure to obtain correct results is many times
attributable.
At the outset it must be noticed that there are usually two
distinct issues involved in the evidence: (I) the issue of the
origin or cause of the fire, that is, whether or not the defendant's
locomotive actually started the conflagration; and (2) the issue
(629)
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of negligence, where such is a factor in liability. The problems
raised by the various presumptions applicable to these two issues
are distinct and in many cases quite different. At all stages of
the proceedings, the evidence tending to prove the one or the
other of these issues as well as proof tending to rebut such evi-
dence must be differentiated. A few considerations in regard to
circumstantial evidence will be found pertinent at this point
of the inquiry.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In most cases of this nature, the plaintiff must rely almost
exclusively upon circumstantial evidence to prove both origin of
the fire and the defendant's negligence.' Not infrequently the
mass of circumstantial evidence on the whole case will be con-
tradictory and conflicting. What amount and quality of such
evidence is required of the plaintiff to establish liability? There
must be some general standard by which to measure the evidence
to determine whether or not it is sufficient to satisfy the judge
that there are issues of fact to submit to the jury. In addition
there should be some general standard or guide for the jury to
employ to determine whether or not the party who has the
burden of proof has sustained it. The ultimate end of the law
must be to develop rules and standards to govern these situations
which are workable and which produce desirable social results.
As to the plaintiff's evidence showing the defendant's causal
connection with the fire, it has been said that the circumstantial
evidence offered by the plaintiff must be of such a character as
to be consistent only with the defendant's responsibility; that is,
that all other reasonable explanations should be negatived. On
the other hand, it is not necessary, it is declared, for the plain-
tiff's evidence to exclude all other possibilities of another origin.
It is sufficient if the facts and circumstances fairly warrant
the conclusion that the fire did not originate from some other
cause. 2 The former test is obviously different from the latter,
'Cf. Wolff v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., 34 Minn. 215, 25 N. W. 63 (1885).
'Moose v. Missouri, K. & T. of Texas, 212 S. W. 645 (Tex. Comm. App.
I913); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 151 Ark. 218, 235
S. W. ioo6 (i92i).
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for here the plaintiff's evidence should merely be such as to war-
rant the conclusion that the plaintiff's engines did start the fire.3
But the stricter rule requires much more. It demands from the
reasonable mind the conclusion that it was so unlikely that there
was any different origin that, in the absence of further evidence,
but one explanation is reasonably available. The mere proba-
bility that the fire was started by a locomotive, it is said, is insuf-
ficient.4
If this is the effect of the above test, there are other stand-
ards that commend themselves as more desirable guides to the
sufficiency of proof required to support a verdict. Social justice
demands a standard which will relieve the plaintiff from such a
high degree of proof. That standard may be extricated from
holdings which permit the jury, on the issue of fact as to origin,
to choose, from several reasonable hypotheses appearing from
the evidence, that one which in its best judgment is the more
reasonable and probable, thus permitting it to adopt the hypoth-
esis that sparks were communicated from the defendant's loco-
motive, although the evidence adduced to support that hypothesis
is not such as to negative every other possible or reasonable
origin.5
ICf. Allen, J., concurring, in Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lusk,
infra note 5; Frame v. Kansas City, C. & S. R. R., 209 S. W. 314 (Mo. I919)
semble. In this case the court has avoided one fallacy, but immediately falls into
a greater one. In reviewing the finding below it was said, at 318: "All the cases
agree that liability may be established by circumstantial evidence, and the rule is
that it is sufficient to take the case to the jury if such evidence shows both a rea-
sonable possibility of the fire being communicated by sparks from the engine and
that such is the most probable and reasonable source of its origin. This is the
.test of whether the case should be submitted to the jury, and in no way conflicts
with the rule that the jury must find from the evidence that the fire did in fact
originate from that source. The one rule defines the province of the court and
the other that of the jury. Taylor v. Lusk, supra (194 Mo. App. 133, 187 S. W.
87 [i916]). So also it is generally the province of the jury in weighing the evi-
dence to apply the rule of circumstantial evidence that, in order to make a case
by such evidence, the circumstances must not only be consistent with the finding
that such was the origin of the fire, but must exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis. Fritz v. Railroad, 243 Mo. 63, 77, 148 S. W. 74."
It is necessary, of course, to distinguish between the test which the court
must apply to determine the sufficiency of the evidence and the actual findings
made by the jury. But there cannot be one test for the trial court and another
for the court of review, the latter based upon the test which the jury employed
or should have employed in passing upon the evidence.
'Sheldon v. Hudson R. R., 29 Barb. 226 (N. Y. i859).
Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lusk, 205 Mo. App. i85, 223 S. W.
8o4 (ig2o); Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Shipley, 39 Md. 251 (1873) ; cf. State ex
rel. Detroit, etc., Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 268 Mo. 239, 187 S. W. 23 (1916).
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Thus it has been said by the Oklahoma court that "cir-
cumstantial evidence in a civil case, in order to be sufficient to sus-
tain a verdict need not rise to that degree of certainty which
will exclude every reasonable conclusion other than the one arrived
at by the jury." 6 With respect to negligence, the Iowa court
has put it thus:
"The case so made is not to be disposed of by the sug-
gestion that other reasonable theories may be advanced to
explain plaintiff's injury. Even in a case depending on
circumstantial evidence alone to establish negligence, the
plaintiff is not bound to negative every other conceivable
theory or hypothesis which ingenuity may invent to account
for his injury. It is only where opposing theories are equally
reasonable and equally consistent with the proved or admitted
facts that plaintiff must fail as a matter of law." "
In Pennsylvania, however, it appears that the strict rule as
to proof of origin of the fire is observed.
"The causal connection must be complete, not admitting
of other possibilities. If the evidence is not sufficient to
establish this connection, the court should so declare as a
matter of law." 8
'Schaff v. Coyle, 12I Okla. 228, 231, 249 Pac. 947, 950 (1926).
'Gordon v. Chicago & R. I. R. R., 146 Iowa 588, 594, 123 N. W. 762, 764(I9O9). But cf. Asback v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 74 Iowa 248, 37 N. W. 182
(1888). In any event, the various circumstances must be considered as a whole
rather than each one separately. "An examination of the precedents referred to
will readily demonstrate that in no instance have we gone further than to hold
that, where proof of the alleged negligence and the resulting injury rests solely
upon circumstantial evidence, and the proved circumstances when taken as a
whole and fairly considered are consistent with the exercise of due care on the
part of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover. To say, however, that each
particular circumstance constituting the array of evidence upon which the plain-
tiff relies may be taken separately and subjected to that test, and that if it be
found consistent with any other theory than that of negligence its value is de-
stroyed, is an altogether different proposition. And this, it appears to us, is the
vice of the charge given by the trial court. It takes up one by one the various
alleged circumstances shown upon the part of plaintiff and tells the jury that,
if such happening is one which 'might' have occurred from some other cause than
the negligence charged, it must be disregarded as without probative weight and
value in reaching their verdict. It is scarcely too much to say that, if this rule is
to be approved, no case, civil or criminal, can ever be established by circumstan-
tial evidence." Bryce v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., 129 Iowa 342, 348, 105 N.
W. 497, 499 (19o6).
8 Kalback v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 277 Pa. 307, 311, 312, 121 At. 204,
205 (1923).
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The best and simplest standard here seems to be whether
or not the circumstances make it probable and are such as to
justify a reasonable inference that the fire was caused by the
defendant's locomotive.9 On this issue, surely it should not be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the fire by which his
property was destroyed could not have been started in any other
way than from sparks from the defendant's locomotive, and
reputable courts have so declared. 10 But while we may reject
the test which compels the plaintiff to establish causal connec-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt," it must still be remembered
that here he has the burden of proof, in consequence of which,
where the evidence shows that there was as great a likelihood
that the fire started from the plaintiff's own acts as from the
defendant's causal connection with the fire, the jury cannot find
for the plaintiff. The defendant, in fact, is entitled to a verdict
if the inferences on the whole of the evidence are equal, on the
ground that the plaintiff's proof does not show a preponder-
ance of evidence.' 2 The mere possibility, however, that the fire
may have occurred in some other way is insufficient to rebut a
reasonable inference from all the facts that the defendant's loco-
motive started it.' 3 The same general test may be properly applied
in the first instance to the evidence on the issue of negligence.
If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, in the absence
of material rebutting evidence, he will, of course, get to the jury.
What specific facts and combinations of circumstances are neces-
sary to make out this so-called "prima facie case"? What is the
effect of this and other stronger presumptions on both major
issues? These are the practical questions involved, a correct an-
swer to which demands an accurate and rational theory of bur-
den of proof and of presumptions.
'Kansas City, etc., R. R v. Perry, 65 Kan. 792, 70 Pac. 876 (1902); Foster
v. Missouri P. R. R., I43 Mo. App. 547, 128 S. W. 36 (igio).
'0 Monte Ne. R. R. v. Philipps, 8o Ark. 292, 96 S. W. io6o (I9o6); Kansas
City, etc., R. R. v. Perry, supra note 9.
' Cf. Burke v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 Heisk. 451, 461, 462 (Tenn. 1872);
Baltimore & 0. R. M. v. Shipley, supra note 5.
I Bates Co. Bank v. Missouri P. R. R., 98 Mo. App. 330, 73 S. W. 286(0903).
"*Kelley v. Wabash R. R., 151 Mo. App. 307, 131 S. W. 718 (igio).
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PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL
A failure to clearly distinguish between the particular pre-
sumptions raised at different stages of the proof may very well
account for the lack of agreement as to their effect which has
always been so noticeable in the cases. Courts frequently use
the expression "prima facie case" and the term "presumption"
synonymously ;14 and this is accurate enough providing the proper
kind and the same presumption is always intended.15 By a prima
facie case, we understand one that affords evidence sufficient in
probative value to warrant the jury in reasonably returning an
affirmative verdict on the issue involved, in the absence of any
rebutting evidence. When a litigant has made out a prima facie
case, he is assured of getting to the jury provided no evidence
is offered by his adversary, and nothing more. In other words,
he is safeguarded against a directed verdict or an involuntary
nonsuit at that particular stage of the trial.1
But the jury is not required, as a matter of law, to find
in favor of the party making out a prima facie case. It is war-
ranted, but not compelled, to make such a finding. If the plain-
tiff has made out such a case, with no further presumption to
aid him, he may still fail to get an affirmative verdict as a result
of his failure to sustain or satisfy his burden of proof.lv Conse-
quently there can be no directed verdict either way and there is
presented a question which if, there be no further evidence, must
be passed upon by the jury. Now the question as to whether
the plaintiff has sustained the burden of proof will be decided
sbely by the jury, and their verdict will indicate the result. It
will be seen, of course, that a prima facie case in this sense is,
strictly speaking, no presumption at all. It has been called a
uFor example, Howard v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R, z96 Iowa 1378, I95 N.
W. 153 (923).
"See In re Locust Building Co., 299 Fed. 756, syl. 5 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
"For different uses of the expression "prin fade," see In re Sanger, I69
Fed. 722, 724 (N. D. W. Va. igog) (throwing burden of proof upon adversary);
Rex v. Almon, 5 Burr. 2686 (1771) (throwing burden of producing evidence
upon adversary) ; Regina v. O'Doherty, 6 State Trials (N. s.) 831 (z848) (the
meaning adopted in the text).
"7 By failing to get his affirmative verdict, we regard the plaintiff as failing
to sustain the burden of proof.
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"permissible inference," I but since the immemorial usage of
common law courts has designated it a presumption, it will be
referred to in the subsequent pages as presumption number one.
Another type of situation which occasionally arises in prov-
ing liability of a railroad for a fire is that which imposes upon
one or the other party the duty of coming forward with some
kind of evidence in rebuttal. A presumption is said to arise from
proof of facts which are to be regarded as establishing the exist-
ence of certain other facts, unless the adversary can throw doubt
upon the inference by coming forward with evidence showing a
likelihood or possibility that the inferred facts do not, in truth,
exist.1" The basis of this presumption is, of course, the reason-
ableness of the inference in the light of the common experience
of mankind; that experience has indicated that a certain group
of facts is usually the result or the cause of certain other facts
or groups of facts sought to be proved. Doubt must be cast
upon the reasonableness of such causal relationship, in a particular
case, by rebutting evidence, or it must be taken by the jury as
true.20
It will be noticed that the fact or facts to be inferred here
are operative facts, or those which entail some kind of legal con-
sequences.21 The fact or facts upon which the inference rests
or from which the presumption arises are evidentiary facts.22
The causal relationship which usually exists between these opera-
tive facts and the evidentiary facts, as established by common
observation and experience, furnishes the basis and explanation
of the so-called presumption. It is a device of expediency which
the common law has crystallized into concrete rules of law to
make possible convenient proof of operative facts from eviden-
tiary facts which, for practical purposes, amount to common and
particularized groups or bits of circumstantial evidence.
Since, then, we have a situation here which is said to throw
I Cf. 5 WiGm0, EvmExcE (2d ed. 1923) § 249D, n. i.
5 WIGmOE, op. cit. supra note i8, § 2486.
5 WIGmoRF, op. cit. supra note 18, § 2491.
2 For a discussion of "operative" facts, see HoHFELD, FUNDAmENTAL LEGAL
CoNcEPToIs (Cook's ed. 1923) 32.
= Cf. 5 WGmORE, op. cit. supra note 18, § 249.
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upon the adversary the duty of coming forward with something
by way of explanation to refute the inference, a failure to do so
immediately subjects him to an adverse ruling by the court. In
other words, it is the court's duty, if requested, to direct a verdict
against the party failing to sustain this burden. As soon as the
adversary has offered his rebutting evidence, however, he has
thrown doubt upon the existence of the operative facts to be
inferred, and he is thereby protected from an adverse ruling by
the court, and entitled to have the jury pass upon the issue and
the evidence as a whole, with proper instructions as to the burden
of proof. This presumption is referred to as presumption num-
ber two.2
3
Finally, there is the situation which may be said to raise a
presumption in favor of the party who does not have the burden
of proof. This merely means that certain facts are presumed,
by law, to be true until the contrary is proved by the weight of
evidence. If the adversary presents no evidence whatever, the
party in whose favor the presumption exists is entitled to a
directed verdict.24 Even if the adversary presents some evidence,
there may still be a verdict directed against him, for his evi-
dence may be insufficient to justify reasonable men in finding
in his favor. He has had a duty to present evidence of a certain
minimum weight to overcome a presumption, and unless he sat-
isfies that burden with a substantial amount of evidence, except in
jurisdictions where the scintilla rule obtains, he is liable to a ruling
against him by the judge. This presumption, for convenience,
may be identified as presumption number three. 25 With these dis-
tinctions in mind, we may look at the function of presumptions
in actions against railroads for fires.
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
The theory of most, but not all, actions against railroad
companies for damage caused by fires, is that the fire was due to
'For this scheme of identifying presumptions, see Fowler V. Harper and
Heckel, The Scope and Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22
ILT L. REv. 724, 729-731.
Wio ioRE, op. cit. supra note 18, § 2487 (a).
Harper and Heckel, supra note 23, at 73o, et seq.
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the negligence of the company in the maintenance or operation
of its equipment. 26 In some jurisdictions there is no presumption
whatever to aid the plaintiff in establishing liability.2 7 This does
not mean that he may not make out his case and, perhaps, re-
cover, upon circumstantial evidence alone. It does mean, how-
ever, that he does not have the advantage of particular rules mak-
ing certain definite combinations of facts of sufficient probative
value, as a matter of law, to carry with it a clear and recog-
nizable advantage in the lawsuit. But in many, if not most, juris-
dictions, by statute or otherwise, negligence is presumed from the
fact that property was destroyed by reason of a fire started from
the company's engines.2 8
Some courts have insisted that legislative enactment was
necessary for the application of such a presumption,2 9 while
others have thought that the presumption could be applied in the
absence of statute, it having sufficient authorization in the com-
mon law.30  Thus one court has declared that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, if it were not immediately applicable, at least
offered a direct and persuasive analogy.3 ' Another court, how-
ever, is just as confident that "the rule cannot rest upon the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, for there is no probable connection be-
tween the falling of a spark from a locomotive and negligence as
' See the discussion by the court in Wallace v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
R., 2o8 Mass. i6, 94 N. E. 3o6 (191i).
' Louisville & N. R. R v. Haggard, I6I Ky. 317, i7o S. W. 956 (1914). See
also cases cited in 33 Cyc. 1364. The federal courts have stubbornly clung
to this rule, declaring it "the more logical view." Examine General Ins. Co. of
America v. Northern P. R. PL, 28 F. (2d) 574 (1928), and cases cited in the
opinion.
'Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Studdard, 34 Ga. App. 570, 130 S. E. 532
(1925); Missoula Trust & Savings Bank v. Northern P. R. R., 76 Mont. 2oI,
245 Pac. 949 (1926) ; Tilley v. St Louis & S. F. R. R., 49 Ark. 535, 6 S. W. 8
(1887); Union P. R. R. v. Arthur, 2 Colo. App. 159, 29 Pac. io31 (1892); Jones
v. Michigan C. R. R., 59 Mich. 437, 26 N. W. 662 (1886) ; Anderson v. Wasatch
& J. V. R. R., 2 Utah 518 (1881). Examine cases in 33 Cyc. 1361, 1362. See
also 2 THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. igoi) § 284. For discussion and collec-
tion of authorities on this presumption, see notes in (1913) 3o Ann. Cas. 968;
(igio) 16 Ann. Cas. 879; (1882) 38 Am. Dec. 64; (1895) 42 Am. St. Rep. 53o;
(i9o6) I Ann. Cas. 812.
"Wallace v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., supra note 26.
, Cronk v. Chicago, M. & St P. R. R., 3 S. D. 93, 52 N. W. 42o (1892);
Ellis v. Portsmouth, etc., R. R., 2 Ired. L. 138 (N. C. 1841) ; Burke v. Louis-
ville & N. R. R., supra note ii.
-" Southern R. R. v. Dickens, I61 Ala. 144, 49 So. 766 (igog).
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is required for the application of that doctrine." 32 Regardless
of this difference of opinion, as to theory, the majority of states
have adopted the rule that some kind of presumption is raised
either by reason of, or in the absence of, statutory authority.33
Now if there is a presumption of negligence, it is important
to know whether it is presumption number one, number two, or
number three. If it be presumption number three, it means that
the defendant has the burden, not merely of coming forward
with evidence of due care, but of proving by a preponderance of
the whole evidence that it was guilty of no negligence in this
respect.3 4 The defendant, rather than the plaintiff, must assume
the risk of non-persuasion on the issue of negligence. In other
words, as soon as the plaintiff has proved that his property was
destroyed by a fire set out by a railroad locomotive, the burden
of proof is upon the defendant to prove that he has employed
due care, and he must get a verdict from the jury in his favor
on this issue. 3
This is very clearly the presumption in some states. As ably
set forth by Judge Mitchell in a Minnesota case:
"This statute, in our opinion, establishes the same rule
which has been established by similar statutes in a number of
other states, and which has been by many courts held to be
a common law principle, in the absence of statute, viz., that
where damage is caused by fire which is proven to have es-
caped from the engine of a railroad company, a presumption
of negligence on the part of the company arises which casts
"Wallace v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., supra note 26, at 1g, 94 N. E. at
307; cf. Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 728 (1863) (where Pollock, C. B., in a
leading res ipsa case, thought that a barrel "could not roll out of a warehouse
without some negligence").
"See numerous cases collected in the note (i9o6) i Ann. Cas. 812.
U See 33 Cyc. 1361-1364.
""From the practical viewpoint, the situation does not involve a shifting of
the burden of proof. The plaintiff assumed the burden of proving negligence
only as he is required to prove the fire, and that it was caused by defendant;
whereas, from the beginning, the burden is on the defendant to make affirmative
proof that it was in the exercise of due care." Stewart v. Iowa Central L R.,
136 Iowa 182, 186, I13 N. W. 764, 765 (1907). Accordingly, "if defendant ad-
mits that the fire was caused by sparks from its locomotive and pleads facts indi-
cating lack of negligence its plea is in effect a plea of confession and avoidance,
and it therefore assumes the burden of proof." 33 Cyc. 1364; cf. Illinois C. R.
R. v. Barrett, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1755, 66 S. W. 9 (igo2) ; Bohlen, The Effect of
Rebuttable Presumption of Law Upon the Burden. of Proof (192o) 68 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 307, 319 (as to the presumption "shifting" the burden of proof).
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the onus or burden of proof upon the railroad company to
show affirmatively that they were not guilty of any negli-
gence . . .
"The effect of the statute is that where it is estab-
lished that the fire causing the damage was scattered or
thrown from the company's engine, the burden of proof
is cast upon the company to show affirmatively that it did
its duty in the premises, and was not in fact guilty of any
negligence. This it must do by satisfactory evidence, as in
any case where a party holds the affirmative of an issue, or
where the burden of proof is cast upon him." 31
It is clear here what the force of the presumption must be, at
different stages of the proof. If the defendant offers no evidence
of due care whatever, the plaintiff, on proving the facts raising
the presumption, is undeniably entitled to a directed verdict.37
In case the defendant offers slight but by no means satisfactory
proof of due care, he is still liable to a directed verdict, in all
jurisdictions denying the scintilla rule, for as a matter of law he
has not sustained the burden which the presumption threw upon
him.38 A failure to direct a verdict against him under these
circumstances is error. Even if the evidence presented by the
defendant were strong enough to evenly balance the plaintiff's
proof, the jury must find for the plaintiff and instructions to
such effect must be given.
But many courts have attributed only. presumption number
two to the circumstance that the railroad company set out or
scattered the fire. Thus it has been said that "strictly and tech-
nically, it is probably true that a so-called 'statutory presumption'
does not change the burden of proof, but merely determines the
right to a verdict if no other evidence is introduced." 39 Again,
it was said by the same court:
" Karson v. Milwaukee & St P. M. M, 29 Minn. x, I4, II N. W. I22,
123 (x88i).
'7Missouri, K. & T. R. R. v. Prickryl, 26 S. W. 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894);
Missouri, K. & T. R. R. v. Kelley, 30 S. W. 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
"Cf. Stewart v. Iowa Central R. R., supra note 35; and language employed
in German Ins. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 128 Iowa 386, 39o, 391, IO4 N. W.
36i,363 (r9o5).
m See Howard v. Chicago B. & Q. R. P, supra note 14, at 1383, 195 N. W.
at r55.
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"We have uniformly held . . . that plaintiff made a
prima facie case by proving . . . that the fire originated
from the operation of a railroad . . . and we have fre-
quently declared that where such a prima facie showing was
made, the burden or duty rested upon the railroad company
to make proof of its freedom from negligence." 40
Now the defendant is not required to get an affirmative ver-
dict upon the issue of negligence. He must come forward with
some evidence or lose,41 but he is not required to convince the
jury affirmatively that he has used due care. If the evidence is
evenly balanced, the jury is bound to find for him. 42 If the de-
fendant offers evidence, however slight, to meet the plaintiff's
presumption, it is sufficient to insure to the defendant that his case
will go to the jury. He has met the only burden that was cast
upon him by at least introducing evidence tending to throw doubt
upon the question of negligence. By thus raising a doubt, he
destroys the legal effect of the plaintiff's presumption and the
case must go to the jury as any other doubtful issue, to pass upon
the circumstantial evidence as a whole.43
Few courts have held that the presumption raised in the
plaintiff's favor is less than number two, i. e., that it amounted
'o Supra note 14, at 1384, 195 N. W. at 155. "To make proof" here appar-
ently means to come forward with evidence. In some of the Iowa cases, it has a
different meaning. The older cases are not at all consistent with later decisions
as to the force and effect of the presumption. Cf. this case with Stewart v. Iowa
Central R. R-, stpra; note 35; German Ins. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R R., suprat
note 38; Small v. C. R. I. & P. Ry., 50 Iowa 338 (1879); Engle v. Chicago, M.
& St. P. R. R., 77 Iowa 661, 37 N. W. 6 (1888).
""Even when the plaintiff has made out a prima fade case, the burden of
proof does not always shift to the defendant in any proper sense. All that is
meant by such an expression is that the other party must go forward with his
proofs, if he would not have judgment against him .... It is clearly a mis-
nomer of terms to say that the burden of proof swings like a pendulum from one
side to the other, during the progress of a trial. All. that is meant is that the
duty of introducing evidence to meet a prima facie case shifts back and forth."
Gibbs v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 123 Iowa 736, 741, 742, 99 N. W. 703, 705,
706 (1904).
2 Shipman v. Chicago, B. & Q. I- R., 78 Neb. 43, 1 ioN. W. 535 (907);
Toledo, St L. & W. R. R. v. Star Flouring Mills Co., 146 Fed. 953 (C. C. A.
6th, i9o6). Cf. the analogous situation created under the presumption produced
by res ipsa loqidtur in Scellers v. Universal Service Co., 68 Cal. App. 252, 228
Pac. 879 (1924) ; cited in Harper and Heckel, supra. note 23, at 746, n. 126. Cf.
also Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Morgen Bros., 146 S. W. 336 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912), i93 S. W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
4See Heimi v. Chicago G. W. R. R., 1O2 Iowa 25, 28, 7o N. W. 746, 748
(1897) ; cf. 33 Cyc. 1364, n. 44.
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to no more than a prima facie case, in the narrowest sense, suffi-
cient only to carry the case to the jury if there were no further
evidence by either party. The language, however, is by no means
clear in many instances, and one must frequently look to the
results to determine what theory of presumption has actually been
employed.
It is, indeed, a sorry situation when the courts hopelessly
confuse the presumptions as to negligence, or when they regard
the difference between presumption number two and presump-
tion number three as purely academic or of no "practical" im-
portance. 44  Thus we may find the singular phenomenon of a
trial court nicely instructing the jury as to presumption number
three, clearly and unequivocally throwing upon the defendant the
burden of proof as to negligence, while the appellate court ex-
pends eloquence and learning to show that the law of the state
allows only presumption number two here-though affirming
the decision below because the instruction was not prejudicial. 45
""Counsel on either side have gone deeply into discussion of the law with
respect to the force and effect of presumptions in the trial of an issue of fact.
We deem it unnecessary, in this case, to attempt any final answer to this more
or less vexed question, upon which some modern law writers and courts have
expended (or wasted) a vast amount of learning without shedding upon it any
appreciable degree of light." Ohlson v. Sac County, etc., Ins. Ass'n, i9i Iowa
479, 481, 182 N. W. 879, 88o (I9zi). "Appellant contends that the 'burden of
proof did not shift; that the only 'burden' that rested upon the appellant was the
'burden of producing evidence,' and the duty of going forward with its testimony
to meet, or overcome, the prna facie case made by appellee. The discussion of
'presumptions of law,' 'presumptions of fact, 'statutory presumptions,' 'burden
of proof,' and 'burden of evidence' may be interesting, but it is not always fruit-
ful in results." Howard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., supra note 14, at 1382, 195
N. W. at 155. One cannot help recalling how frequently have courts made light
of problems which they found difficult to solve.
"See Howard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., supra note 14, at 1381, 195 N. W.
at i54. The trial court instructed as follows: "But if you find by the greater
weight or preponderance of the evidence that said fire was caused by the escape
of fire or sparks from defendant's engine, then plaintiff would be entitled to re-
cover unless you find by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant or its employees operating said engine were not guilty of negli-
gence in any of the respects alleged in the petition." These instructions were
entirely warranted in view of some of the previous decisions in the state. See
Stewart v. Iowa Central R. R., supra note 35; German Ins. Co. v. Chicago & N.
W. R. R., supra note 38. It would be impossible, it would seem, to instruct more
accurately on presumption number three.
The court, on review, at 1387, 195 N. W. at 156, apparently saw little differ-
ence between this presumption and presumption number two, save in terminology,
for after pointing out that "technically it is the 'burden of the evidence'" that
devolves upon defendant rather than the "burden of proof," it concluded thatI
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It is difficult for counsel to predict or for trial courts to instruct
under such circumstances.
But now let it be assumed that the defendant offers clear
and satisfactory evidence of due care, which evidence, in turn,
is neither contradicted nor refuted by the plaintiff. The question
is immediately presented whether the defendant is not now enti-
tled to a ruling by the court in his favor .
4
The question is sometimes answered according to the pre-
sumption in force as to negligence. It is clear, however, that if
the defendant is entitled to such a ruling under presumption
number three, it follows, a fortiori, that he must have it under
any of the other presumptions. The first objection to such a
result is that the defendant, under the stronger presumption, has
the burden of proving due care, and therefore cannot expect a
ruling by the court in his favor. The objection to directing a
verdict in favor of the party having the burden of proof, how-
ever, is untenable. There is no logical reason to prevent directed
verdicts for parties having the affirmative of an issue as well as
for parties who have initial presumptions in their favor, if
the conditions warrant such a direction.
4 7
Especially is the result indicated above a rational one where
the plaintiff's proof consists exclusively of the presumption. Nev-
ertheless some courts have refused to direct for the defendant in
railroad fire cases, insisting that the question was for the jury
as it involved the credibility of witnesses. 8 It is regarded as a
while the instructions might have been "amplified" and "perhaps more happily
and technically worded," still, it was not "such an erroneous statement of the rule
of law applicable . . . that it misled the jury."
"For the purposes of this problem, "dear and satisfactory" evidence must
be regarded as evidence which, if believed, completely rebuts the inference of
negligence. Evidence merely "tending" to prove due care will not be sufficient.
Thus, the.mere fact that the locomotive was inspected before the trip raises no
presumption of law that it was in proper condition during the trip. Louisville
& N. R. R. v. Malone, IO9 Ala. 509, 20 So. 33 (896). It will be a question of
fact, too, whether leaving near the track materials claimed to be combustible will
amount to negligence. Gibbons v. Wisconsin V. R. R., 66 Wis. 161, 28 N. W.
170 (1886).
" See infra note 8o.
"Great Northern Ry. v. Coats, 115 Fed. 452 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) (but with
a strong dissenting opinion by Sanborn, J.).
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case of conflicting evidence-the presumption on the one side and
the defendant's rebutting evidence on the other.49  The better
cases, however, uphold the contrary doctrine and affirm the duty
of the trial court to direct for the defendant under such cir-
cumstances, 50 an altogether sound result and one consistent with
a rational theory of presumptions. When the evidence is undis-
puted, the questions of the amount and weight of such rebutting
evidence are dearly questions of law." More especially is a
direction by the court justified in the present problem, for the
question of credibility is not so acute where the plaintiff's evidence
consists exclusively of his initial presumption. Accordingly,
Mitchell, J., observed:
"We do not think or hold that the mere fact that the
fire was set by an engine has such an effect as direct evi-
dence of negligence as would warrant a jury in finding neg-
ligence, if the otherwise uncontradicted evidence on the part
of the railroad company showed satisfactorily that it had
fully preformed its duty in the premises. And if a jury
should so find, it would be the right and duty of the court
to set aside the verdict, as in any other case where it was
not justified by the evidence." 52
"See Heimi v. Chicago G. W. R. R., supra note 43, at 28, 7o N. W. at 748.
' Karson v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. R., supra note 36; Menomonie River
Sash & Door Co. v. M. & N. R. R., 91 Wis. 447, 65 N. W. 176 (1895) ; Spalding
v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 33 Wis. 582 (1873). Where the presumption looks
as though it were number two only, the same result must necessarily follow. See
Cronk v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., supra note 30, at 00, 52 N. W. at 423,
with which compare the effect of the presumption under statutes making rail-
roads liable for killing stock on their rights-of-way, as in Huber v. Chicago, M.
& St. P. R. R., 6 Dak. 392, 396, 43 N. W. 81g, 82o (I889), where it was said:
"In the case at bar, the plaintiff having proved the killing, and the defendant hav-
ing showed that it exercised proper care and precautions to prevent the injury-
that it was not negligent-and the plaintiff offering no evidence tending to prove
that the horse was in fact killed by defendant's negligence, there was nothing for
the jury to determine, and the motion of defendant should have been granted."
Also Kentucky C. R. R. v. Talbot, 78 Ky. 621 (i88o) ; Hodgins v. M. St. P. &
S. S. M. R. R., 3 N. D. 382, 56 N. W. i39 (x893). And if the presumption in
favor of the plaintiff is no more than number one, the result is beyond question.
See Southern R. R. v. Pace, 114 Ga. 712, 713, 40 S. E. 723 (1902).
" Menomonie River Sash & Door Co. v. M. & N. R. R., supra note 50.
'See Karson v. M. & St. P. R. R., supra note 36, at 14, 15, II N. W. at 122,
x23; Great Northern Ry. v. Coats, supra note 48, at 458 (dissent by Sanborn, J.,
containing a collection of cases and authorities).
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When to this doctrine is added the principle that a court is re-
quired to direct a verdict in cases where, if a contrary one were
returned, it would be compelled to set it aside,53 the result com-
mended above in railroad fire cases is undeniable.
The statutes fixing responsibility for fires in these cases have
been differently interpreted in different states. In some states, for
example, not only is a presumption of negligence raised, but the
presumption is said to be "conclusive." 54 This means, of course,
that there is really no presumption at all, because negligence is not
a factor in the theory of liability. The statute practically makes
railroads insurers against damage done by fire started from their
locomotives. No evidence of due care should be admissible here,
because it is irrelevant, and, if admitted, would surely confuse
the jury on the issues before it.
Where the matter is actually one of presumption, it is seen
that it is based upon the circumstance of the fire having originated
with engines belonging to the company, the care and management
of which were exclusively within its knowledge. It is not unjust
to require the defendant to come forward and offer proof or
actually prove due care. The difference in the presumption will
determine the difference in the severity of the penalty for a fail-
ure to do so, or, to be more accurate, the difference in the penalty
will determine what particular presumption is raised.
In Pennsylvania there is no statute affecting proof of neg-
ligence and the problem is controlled exclusively by the rules
of the common law. The early cases in the state consistently held
that there was no presumption whatever of negligence to aid
the plaintiff in these actions.5" Negligence must be proved and
the burden was always on the plaintiff.56 The defendant corn-
'Froling v. Howard, 125 Me. 507, 131 At. 308 (1925) ; Lavery v. Brigance,
242 Pac. 239 (Okla. 1926).
"' Schaff v. Coyle, supra note 6; 33 Cyc. 1327 (where a note states that
Colorado, Connecticut, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Can-
ada follow this strict rule of liability as a result of statute). Such statutes are
constitutional. Union P. R. R. v. DeBusk, 12 Colo. 294, 20 Pac. 752 (i889).
Philadelphia & R. R. R. v. Yeiser, 8 Pa. 366 (1848) ; Philadelphia & R. R.
R. v. Yerger, 73 Pa. 121 (1873) ; Albert v. Northern C. R. R., 98 Pa. 316 (i88i).
'Albert v. Northern C. R. R., supra note 55.
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pany could usually be exculpated by showing that its engines
were equipped with modern spark arresting apparatus.57 As said
by Read, J., in Lackawanna R. R. v. Doak:
"Railroad companies are authorized by law to use loco-
motives propelled by steam generated by burning wood, coal
whether anthracite or bituminous, or any other ordinary
fuel. The use, therefore, of fire with its necessary con-
comitants, is legal, and the limit imposed upon its use is that
the latest improvements in its management in practical use
should be applied to it." 58
There was no presumption or even permissible inference of
negligence from the mere fact of fire.5 9 Nor was the recurrence
of fires in the same locality caused by the defendant's engiies
evidence of negligence. 60 But while modern cases in the state
sound remarkably like the rule laid down in the old cases, it would
be a mistake to conclude that the law has not undergone change.
It is true that it is difficult to find fault with the logic of the Doak
case. Mechanically 61 it is impregnable. On the other hand, it
is easy to understand how many of the western states evolved
distinctly liberal rules, calculated to favor the basic industry of
the locality-agriculture. Railroads could better stand the loss
of destroyed crops and farm buildings than the farmers upon
whom the prosperity of the state primarily rested. For similar
reasons, no doubt, Pennsylvania adhered to strict requirements
of proof of negligence. But as the protective attitude toward rail-
roads has become less pronounced, the old rules have been mod-
erated, not by legislative enactment, as in many cases in the West,
but by the traditional common law agency, judicial decision and
application.
" Trickett, Liability of Railroad Companies for Negligently Caused Fires
(i9o8) 3 DICKINsoN L. REV. 33, 48, et seq.
Zs 52 Pa. 379, 380 (1866).
59I WEIn E, PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD LAW (1893) 7o6; Jennings v. Penn-
sylvania R. R., 93 Pa. 337 (I879).
"Philadelphia & R. R. R. v. Yeiser, supra note 55.
"Cf. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (19O5) 8 CoL L. REV. 605.
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Thus it is not surprising to find, toward the latter part of
the Nineteenth Century, less evidence required to carry the case
to the jury on the question of negligence than previously. Hence,
evidence of unusually large sparks being thrown out was suffi-
cient to satisfy the judge that there was a jury question.62 Evi-
dence of the accumulation of combustible materials along the
right-of-way and of a fire appearing shortly after the passing of
a train has been held sufficient. 63 The rule has been declared to
be that the plaintiff must not only prove negligence but that he
must prove negligence in the management of the particular loco-
motive that caused or could have caused the fire, 64 but if the
specific engine cannot be identified it may be shown that other
engines set fires or threw sparks for an equal distance within
a reasonable period before or after the fire and in the same vicin-
ity.65 When once a verdict for the plaintiff has been obtained, by
adhering strictly to the general principle of appeal that the most
favorable inference possible will be indulged from the evidence to
support the verdict, courts of appeal have helped to accomplish
in their way what has been brought about elsewhere by more
pronounced tinkering with the theory of proof.6 G In this way,
Pennsylvania has modified the results of a strict application of
the early doctrine. Still, however, the mere fact of fire and
destruction of property alone can be said to raise no presump-
tion of negligence, but added circumstances may be sufficient to
make out a prima facie case (presumption number one), without
direct proof of negligence. 67
'Lehigh V. R. R. v. McKeen, go Pa. 122 (1879) ; Philadelphia & R. R. R.
v. Shultz, 93 Pa. 341 (i88o) ; Van Stuben v. Central R. R. of N. J., 178 Pa. 367,
35 Atl. 992 (1896) ; Thomas v. New York C. & St. L. R. R., 182 Pa. 538, 38
Ad. 413 (1897) ; Byers v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 222 Pa. 547, 72 At. 245 (1909).
Elder Township School District v. Pennsylvania R. R., 26 Pa. Super.
112 (19o4) ; cf. Sollenberger v. Pennsylvania R. R., 290 Pa. 415, 139 Atl. 127
(927).
Kalback v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., supra note 8; Shelly v. Philadelphia
& R. R. R., 211 Pa. 16o, 6o Atl. 58I (19O5).
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 253 Pa. 54, 97 Atl. l051
(1916) ; Trickett, supra note 57, at 57-59 ("identification" in Pennsylvania).
' Sollenberger v. Pennsylvania R. R., sitpra note 63.
"And it is also to be noted that cases which do not, in fact, touch the
question of the presumption of negligence from the mere fact of the communica-
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So it is seen that the rules of law governing the vital ques-
tions in these cases vary widely. The correct application of these
rules is vital to a scientific litigation of such controversies. As
to the correctness of the rules themselves, it must be recognized
that there is involved no question of "right" or "wrong," in the
traditional sense. It is solely a question of law-making, and,
therefore, a question of making rules which are socially workable
and which produce consequences that fairly represent the desires
and meet the needs of the community.68 The social theory to
justify the rule of absolute liability, regardless of negligence, is
obviously that of "social insurance" and of putting loss where
it can most easily be carried and where it can be better distributed.
The justification of the rules determining just what force the pre-
sumption of negligence will have (i. e., what advantage it will
carry for the plaintiff), while one of policy, is to be found in
somewhat different considerations. Here it is a matter of con-
venience and workability in establishing liability. In every case,
however, it is the final justification of the rule of law, in desirable
consequences in the social order, that should furnish the criteria
for judgment or for rationalization.
PRESUMPTION OF ORI3IN
To invoke a presumption of negligence, it is presupposed, of
course, that the fire was started from sparks set out by the de-
fendant's locomotives. This is not always easy to prove. Fre-
quently, the only evidence at the plaintiff's disposal is that the
fire occurred along or near the railroad right-of-way, and that,
some time before, a train had passed. To overcome this diffi-
culty, it is said that a presumption of cause is raised from cer-
tain circumstances from which it might reasonably be inferred
tion of fire are likely to be confused with adjudications directly upon this point.
Thus in many cases the attendant circumstances shown by the evidence may be
such as to raise a presumption of negligence, even though the bare fact that fire
was communicated by the engine would not suffice for that purpose." Note
(i9o6) i Ann. Cas. 812.
I Cf. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause (1927) 6 N. C.
L. REv. 1, 14; Bohlen, supra note 35, at 315,'316.
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that the locomotive started the fires.69 Thus it is declared that
the fact that a locomotive passed over or near the place where
the fire was discovered, and within a short time previous thereto,
emitting sparks and cinders, is sufficient to raise a presumption
of cause.7° Now, the effect will again depend upon the kind and
force of the presumption raised. If the presumption is number
three, or number two, a failure by the defendant to offer proof
will subject it to a directed verdict on the question of origin.7'
A mere explanation or suggestion of other reasonable causes
might satisfy presumption number two, but not number three.
The defendant, under the lesser presumption, must merely cast
doubt upon the issue. Until such rebutting evidence is offered,
or until such explanation is given, the defendant is liable to a
direction against him. The court may, under such circumstances,
instruct the jury to find that the defendant's engines actually
started the fire, which finding, in states where the strict rule of
liability prevails and negligence is not a factor, would be suffi-
cient to render the defendant liable.72
It seems, however, that the accurate and generally conceded
rule here is that proof of this type is to be regarded as affording
the plaintiff merely a prma facie case that the defendant's engines
' JONES, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1924) § 166. In Sheldon v. Hudson River R.
R., 14 N. Y. 218, 222 (1856), Chief Justice Denio said: "It was offered to be
shown that a practice on the part of the company, which would have endangered
this building, was indulged in about the time and near the place where the build-
ing was burned. That fact rendered probable to a certain degree that the in-
jury was attributable to that cause, but it left it in the power of the defendants not
only to controvert the evidence generally, but to show that the special facts ap-
plicable directly to the occurrence of the fire were such as to overcome the gen-
eral inference from the plaintiff's evidence, and to avoid the presumption which
that evidence created."
,. Gibbons v. Wisconsin V. R. R., s pra note 46; Thomason v. Kansas City
S. R. R., 122 La. 995, 48 So. 432 (19o9); Nelson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 47
S. D. 228, 197 N. W. 288 (1924) ; Missoula Trust & Savings Bank v. Northern
P. R. R., supra note 28; Stockdale v. Midland V. R. R., 113 Kan. 635, 215 Pac.
102I (1923) ; Missouri V. N. A. R. R. v. Philips, 97 Ark. 54, 133 S. W. 191
(igio); Goodman v. Lehigh V. R. R., 78 N. J. L. 317, 74 Atl. 519 (igog). Some
of these cases had the additional element of a wind blowing in the direction of
the plaintiff's property.
' Cf. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kreager, 61 Ohio St. 312, 56 N. E. 203
(1899) ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gibson, 42 Kan. 34, 21 Pac. 788 (1889).
" Cf. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Kreager, supra note 71, especially at 327, 56 N.
E. at 204.
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started the fire. 73 Thus the plaintiff is assured of getting to the
jury if no rebutting evidence is introduced, and no verdict can
be directed against him on the grounds that he has offered insuffi-
cient evidence to warrant a finding in his favor on the material
issues. 74
Under such a rule, from the proved facts, there is a per-
missible inference of the defendant's causal connection with the
fire that occasioned the damage. The jury is not required to so
find, but it may so find if it sees fit. There is some evidence
that the defendant's engines started the fire, and it is for the jury
to say whether this evidence is convincing, that is, whether it is
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence, for the plaintiff is under this burden all through
this phase of the case. If a finding is made for or against the
plaintiff, it will not be disturbed, for the jury is free, so far as
the law is concerned, to find either way.7"
It will not infrequently happen that the plaintiff will have
an opportunity to invoke two presumptions which are available
to assist him, and a failure to employ either may greatly prejudice
his case. Suppose, in a state where proof of the accident throws
the burden upon the defendant to prove due care (presumption
number three), the plaintiff is able to show only that the defend-
ant's engines passed across his lands, shortly before the fire, emit-
ting quantities of sparks. What requests and instructions may
he make upon such circumstantial evidence? Must he rely upon
general principles pertaining to circumstantial evidence, or are
there concrete and specific technical rules that he may employ?
If the defendant offers no evidence whatever, obviously there is
a jury case. If a general verdict is returned for the plaintiff, it
will be upheld. In the first place, the jury was justified in find-
,Greenfield v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 83 Iowa 270, 49 N. W. 95 (I89 I ) ;
Union P. R R. v. DeBusk, supra note 54; St. Louis S. E. R. R. v. Trotter, 89
Ark. 273, 116 S. W. 227 (1gog); Gulf C. & S. F. R. R. v. Meentzen Bros., 52
Tex. Civ. App. 416, 113 S. W. iooo (9o8).
" Vaughn v. Director Gen. R. R., 218 Ill. App. 595 (920).
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Malone, Gibbons v. Wisconsin V. R. R., both
supra note 46.
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ing that the defendant's engines started the fire, since the plain-
tiff had presumption number one to aid him. Having so found,
the jury was then compelled to find that the fire resulted from the
defendant's negligence, since the plaintiff had presumption num-
ber three to assist him here. Since the defendant produced noth-
ing whatever to controvert or rebut the presumption, he must
lose on the question of negligence, as a matter of law. Thus,
the combination of the two presumptions assures the plaintiff
of getting to the jury, and if he wins, insures him against reversal
on appeal. 6 Counsel in such a case can do much to advance the
interests of their cause by requesting accurate instructions which
clearly differentiate the two issues and which carefully make
clear to the jury the force of the presumption applicable to each. 7
It will be noticed that this situation does not constitute
what is sometimes called a "presumption on a presumption."
Here the second presumption is a legal consequence of the oper-
ative facts inferred from the evidentiary facts which establish
the first presumption. The jury may find for the plaintiff on
the question of origin. Now upon this finding the second pre-
sumption is raised, throwing the burden of showing due care
upon the defendant.7
Even if some evidence is offered by the defendant, requests
for instructions should be made with analytical care. It may
be, for example, that all the defendant's evidence goes to the
issue of due care and none whatever to a denial that its engines
started the fire. Since the presumption which the defendant must
overcome as to negligence is far stronger and requires more proof
"' St. Louis S. E. R. R. v. Trotter, supra note 73. Here the evidence showed
that fire was discovered within fifteen or twenty minutes after the passing of a
train the engine of which was emitting sparks. There was no other explanation
of the fire. The court held that an inference was justified that the fire had been
set out by the locomotive, and a presumption thereupon arose of the defendant's
negligence, casting upon him the burden of proving due care. Cf. Ganesville J.
& S. R. R. v. Edmondson, iOI Ga. 747, 29 S. E. 213 (1897) ; Karson v. Milwau-
kee & St. P. R. R., supra note 36.
, Cf. the apparent confusion of the two issues and the evidence as to each
in Gulf C. & S. F. R. R. v. Meentzen Bros., sucpra note 73.
"' Note how simple the problem becomes when handled by a competent court.
Wolff v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., mtpra note i.
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than the presumption as to cause, the amounts of proof in each
case necessary to overcome the plaintiff's advantage should be
accurately distinguished.
On the other hand, there may arise a situation in which
the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. For example, he
may present completely rebutting evidence as to origin. Since
- the presumption against him here was only number one, viz., a
"permissible inference" or what we designate as a prima facie
case, evidence offering a satisfactory explanation of the fire to-
gether with at least some undisputed evidence tending to show
another equally probable origin, would seem to entitle the defend-
ant to a directed verdict, notwithstanding the so-called "presump-
tion" in the plaintiff's favor. It must be remembered that no
presumption of neg!igence is possible against the defendant until
his responsibility for starting the fire is determined.7 9
But if it is to overcome the presumption of negligence that
the defendant's strong rebutting evidence is offered, the problem
is different. Here the defendant has the burden of proving due
care, which means that he must convince the jury by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he has not been negligent. If the
mind is "left in equipoise," the defendant must lose. To sustain
this burden, he offers strong and satisfactory rebutting evidence
which is not disputed and which is not met by counter-rebutting
evidence by the plaintiff. In other words, the plaintiff's evidence
of negligence consists entirely of the presumption and the defend-
ant has countered with strong and conclusive evidence of care
which the plaintiff has not, in turn, met. It is a situation where
the party under the burden of proof asks for a directed verdict
upon evidence which is otherwise clear and convincing and not
disputed or discredited. Clearly, in some jurisdictions, the de-
fendant is entitled to a ruling by the court in his favor.80 If the
"' Cf. Southern R. R. v. Myers, lo8 Ga. 165, 33 S. E. 917 (899).
o The courts are divided here. See the discussion and authorities cited in
Harper and Heckel, supra note 23, at 739-740. But the better authorities indi-
cate that such may notr only be done logically, but, under proper circumstances,
it ought to be done. Sunderland, Directing a Verdict for the Party Having the
Burden of Proof (913) I Mrc~r. L. REv. 198.
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presumption against the defendant on the question of negligence
is only number two, it follows, a fortiori, that he may have a
directed verdict.
But let us suppose that the defendant can offer but slight
evidence as to cause, showing possible explanations of the fire
consistent with his own freedom from connection therewith,
which, if any of them had existed, would negative his own
responsibility. While it is true that the presumption against
him is only number one, a prima facie case, still he cannot be
said to have presented evidence of such weight as to warrant
but one conclusion. Since reasonable minds might differ, de-
pending upon which of the several hypotheses were adopted, the
defendant can do no more than get to the jury. A directed ver-
dict for him here is certainly error,8 ' except under the strictest
requirements as to necessary circumstantial evidence to support a
verdict for the plaintiff.8 2
If his slight evidence goes, not to the issue of cause, but
to the question of negligence, the defendant obviously has not
sustained, as a matter of law, the burden of proof which was
placed upon him by presumption number three. Thus, barring
the application of the scintilla rule, he is liable to a directed
verdict for the plaintiff. Such a slight quantum of evidence could
not, under any circumstances, be regarded as sufficient to sus-
tain the burden of proof, and, since the jury will not be permitted
to return an irrational verdict, it may be instructed to return a
reasonable one, which, in this situation, must necessarily be for
the plaintiff.
Finally, if the evidence offered by the defendant is obvi-
ously more than a slight degree or scintilla, but falls short of
being regarded as conclusively rebutting, there must be a ver-
dict by the jury, both on the question of origin and of neg-
'Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Shipley, supra note 5; Kelley v. Wabash R. R.,
supra note 13.
82 See supra notes 4, 8.
ESTABLISHING RAILROAD LIABILITY FOR FIRES
ligence. A direction either way by the judge will be reversible
error.
8 3
In Pennsylvania it has never been necessary to prove the
fact of origin by direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence may
' To organize the various results suggested above, the following tables may
be convenient. This presentation follows the plan employed by Harper and
Heckel, supra note 23, at 746, 747. A word of caution may be necessary. It is
not suggested that the various quanta of eyidence can be ascertained with math-
ematical nicety. The approximations are only rough, and one classification will
shade into another through imperceptible gradations. When once the proper
classification is determined, however, the result should follow with scientific
predictability.
ISSUE OF CAUSE ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE
Presumption Number One
Plaintiff's Defendant's
Proof Proof Result
Plaintiff's
Proof
Defendant's
Proof Result
i. Train passed none jury case i. Defendant none jury case
shortly be- "caused"
fore fire fire
2. Same slight jury case 2. Same slight jury case
3. Same substantial jury case 3. Same substantial jury case
4. Same conclusive direction for 4. Same conclusive direction for
__ |defendant I defendant
Presumption Number Two
No presumption stronger than presump-
tion number one can be authoritativelyjustified from the mere fact of the pass-
ing of a train shortly before the discovery
of the fire.
i. Defendant none direction for
"caused" plaintiff
fire
2. Same slight jury case
3. Same substantial jury case
4. Same conclusive direction for
defendant, in.
absence of
evidence in
counter-
rebuttal
Presumption Number Three
i. Defendant none direction for
"caused" plaintiff
fire
2. Same, slight same
3. Same substantial jury case
4. Same conclusive direction for
defendant, in
absence of
more evi-
dence
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be sufficient.84 For example, evidence that a locomotive set out
a fire on both sides of a barn has been held evidence that it
fired the barn. Where there was an accumulation of rubbish
along the right-of-way and an engine passed, emitting sparks,
there was evidence, it was said, for the jury.86 Consequently,
Pennsylvania may be said to allow a presumption of origin from
such facts as those above. Whether the mere passing of the train,
alone, with no other attendant circumstance, is sufficient to raise
such a presumption, may well be doubted.
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
The courts are divided as to the rule respecting credibility
of witnesses when the evidence is undisputed, and this allows of
some deviation in the effect of the presumptions in railroad fire
cases. There is no doubt about the province of the jury in deter-
mining credibility of witnesses and the weight to be attached to
evidence when the testimony is conflicting. Some courts have
carried this principle so far as to concede the jury arbitrary
power to believe or disbelieve the witnesses when the testimony
is uncontroverted, 7 but other cases hold'that testimony which is
undisputed, from witnesses who have not been discredited, can-
not be disregarded. Juries will not be permitted to disbelieve
witnesses arbitrarily or capriciously, when there is no rebutting
testimony and nothing in fact or inference to impeach them.
This, it is believed, is the better view. 8
Consequently, when undisputed evidence is offered to prove
that the defendant's engines passed over or near the place where
the fire was discovered shortly before the fire, emitting sparks in
large quantities, this constitutes evidence which must be believed.
Now where the effect of such evidence is to raise presumption
" Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra note 65; Trickett,
supra note 57, at 34, et seq.
Philadelphia & R. R. R. v. Hendrickson, 8o Pa. 182 (1876).
Stephenson v. Pennsylvania R. R., 2o Pa. Super. 157 (902).
' See cases in DEC. DIG., Evidence, § 594.
' Boe v. Lynch, 20 Mont. 80, 49 Pac. 381 (I897); Williams v. Cohn, 201
Iowa 1121, 206 N. W. 823 (1926) ; Inland Empire Candy Co. v. Grant Co., 138
Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14 (1926) ; Turner v. Gackle, i68 Minn. 514, 2o9 N. W. 626
(1926).
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number one, the jury may still reject the inference of origin. The
jury cannot doubt that the train actually passed as testified, but it
may refuse to draw the inference of origin from such fact or
facts.
If, however, these facts establish presumption number two,
thus casting upon the defendant the burden of offering testimony
to throw doubt upon the inference, the conclusion is compelled
in the absence of rebutting testimony, and the jury will be required
to find that the defendant's engines did actually start the fire. Thus
uncontroverted and unquestioned evidence of the passing of the
train under such circumstances creates a situation entitling the
plaintiff to a directed verdict, refusal to grant which will be error.
Similar situations are presented with respect to proving neg-
ligence. Where, as seems to be the case in many states where
a presumption exists at all, proof of origin of the fire raises pre-
sumption number three, throwing the burden of proof upon the
defendant, such evidence, if uncontroverted and undisputed, is
sufficient to require, as a matter of law, a finding of negligence,
and thus assure to the plaintiff a verdict."0
DEFENSE
Due Care
Where the plaintiff's presumption of negligence on the part
of the defendant is such as to cast upon him the burden of
proving due care, the same becomes, of course, an affirmative
defense which relieves the plaintiff of the necessity of pleading
it although his theory of recovery is still one of negligence. 90
"When an injury has been occasioned by fire set out
in the operation of a railroad, the presumption is that the
corporation operating the railroad was guilty of negligence.
It is sufficient for the plaintiff in such cases to set
forth simply its occurrence in his pleading. The allegation
of negligence in plaintiff's petition was therefore redund-
ant; for proof by him of such negligence was not essential
o See stpra note 37.
"Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Home Ins. Co., 183 Ind. 355, iO8 N. E.
525 (i915) ; St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Snaveley, 47 Kan. 637, 28 Pac. 6,5
(1892); Seska v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., 77 Iowa 137, 41 N. W. 596 (I889).
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to his right of recovery, and the fact that his pleading con-
tained an unnecessary averment does not change the rule
as to the quantum of proof he is required to make." 91
Due care, as an affirmative defense, must thus be pleaded
and proved by the defendant, with the burden on him to estab-
lish by the preponderance of the evidence the affirmative of the
issue thus raised. It would seem, however, that where the pre-
sumption is anything less than number three, that is, when it is
mere evidence of negligence which may or may not cast some
lesser burden upon the defendant, negligence should be pleaded
by the plaintiff to avoid a defective complaint.
Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence is generally regarded as a defense,
the burden of establishing which rests on the defendant,9 2 although
some courts have held, in the absence of a statute, that the bur-
den was upon the plaintiff to show his want of contributory
negligence,9 3 or, if he knew of the ignition of the fire, to show
that he had employed all reasonable means to extinguish it.94
What amounts to contributory negligence in these cases,
by a failure to take proper precautions to prevent fires from
railroad locomotives, will be determined by allowing the plaintiff
to assume that the defendant will exercise due care. Owners
of property along railroad lines will not be compelled to antici-
pate the railroad companies' negligence.9 5
Under many statutes, especially in states where a strict lia-
bility is imposed upon railroads, contributory negligence is not
a defense at all,90 unless it is so gross as to be construed as
' Engle v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., supra note 40, at 663, 37 N. W. at 8.
Southern R. R. v. Patterson, io5 Va. 6, 52 S. E. 694 (igo6) ; St. Louis, I.
M. & S. R. R. v. Clements, 82 Ark. 3, 99 S. W. 11o6 (19o7).
Wabash R. R. v. Miller, 18 Ind. App. 549, 48 N. E. 663 (1897) ; Louis-
ville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Carton, 2o Ind. App. 471, 48 N. E. lO47 (1898).
' See Lake E. & W. R. R. v. Kiser, 25 Ind. App. 417, 421, 58 N. E. 505, 5o6
(9oo).
' Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., 232 U. S. 340, 34 Sup. Ct.
415 (1914); Wabash R. R. v. Miller, supra note 93; La Salle v. Central R. R.,
73 Ore. 203, 144 Pac. 414 (1914).
' Evins v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 1O4 Ark. 79, 147 S. W. 452 (1912);
Mathews v. Missouri P. R. R., 142 Mo. 645, 44 S. W. 802 (1897).
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amounting to fraud.9 7 Again, there are statutes in some juris-
dictions which provide that the owner may use his property in
the same manner and to the same extent as before the railroad
was built over or near his land." Such a rule obviously dis-
poses of ordinary questions of contributory negligence. It was
early decided in Pennsylvania that while farmers must assume all
risks of the proper and careful use of the road,99 they need
not guard against the negligence of the railroad company.100
Mitigating Circumstances
Although contributory negligence no longer presents a seri-
ous bar to recovery, as a complete defense, circumstances tend-
ing to mitigate damages are frequently introduced. This is per-
missible under the proper statutory plea, which is usually in the
nature of a confession and avoidance. 1 1 The issue thus raised
may affect the plaintiff's necessary proof insofar as it concedes to
him a prima facie case, but permits new matter to be introduced
by the defendant to avoid liability. By this view such a plea
concedes that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment but for the mat-
ters affirmatively alleged in the answer.'0 2 It is said that
"under the codes the office of pleas in confession and avoid-
ance is performed by defenses of new matter. A plea in con-
fession and avoidance or of new matter in the nature of such
a plea does not deny the allegations of the declaration, but
in legal contemplation confesses them and seeks to avoid
them by new affirmative matter. . . . A plea in confession
and avoidance is necessary only when defendant proposes
7Bowen v. Boston & A. R. R., 179 Mass. 524, 6I N. E. 141 (9Ol).
' See Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stephens, 74 Ill. App. 586, 593 (1897).
'Post v. Buffalo & W. R. R., io8 Pa. 585 (1885). "If a man stacked his
flax so near to a railroad that it obvicusly was likely to be set fire to by a well-
managed train, I should say that he could not throw the loss upon the railroad by
the oscillating result of an inquiry by the jury whether the road had used due
care." Holmes, J., partially concurring, in Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St
P. R. R., supra note 95, at 352-353, 34 Sup. Ct. at 418; see also cases cited in
BoiiLax, CASES ON ToRTs (2d ed. 1925) 5o8.
Philadelphia & R. R. R. v. Hendrickson, supra note 85; cf. Trickett,
supra note 57, at 59, et seq.
I Cain v. Osler, I68 Iowa 59, i5o N. W. 17 (1914).
See 31 CYc. 215, n. 55.
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to admit the truth of a material allegation made by plaintiff,
and to avoid liability thereon by affirmative proof of mat-
ters which destroy the effect of the allegations admitted."'10 3
Now since the party who has the affirmative of an issue ordi-
narily has the burden of proof, 04 manifestly the defendant who
thus seeks to avoid liability in whole or in part 105 must sustain
this burden by a preponderance of the evidence. The general
rule of pleading is applicable here, and matters in mitigation must
be established by the defendant. 10
CONCLUSION
It is apparent, then, that the most favorable situation for
the plaintiff in proving liability of railroads for damages by
fires, is one which raises the strongest presumptions in his favor.
If he can furnish evidence of the discovery of the fire along
or near the right-of-way shortly after the passing of a train, espe-
cially if the locomotive was emitting sparks, he will usually have
a prima facie case as to the question of origin. When he has
any kind of presumption to aid him on the question of negligence,
he has, on the whole matter of liability, a case for the. jury.
If the presumption of origin is number two or number three,
and if negligence is not a factor in the case, he will win by a
ruling by the judge unless the defendant is able to rebut, by
some evidence, the question of cause. If both presumptions should
happen to be number three, the plaintiff would win by a directed
verdict unless the defendant presented a substantial amount of
evidence on at least one issue. Where the presumption as to
origin is number one and the presumption as to negligence num-
ber three, the plaintiff should carefully analyze the defendant's
evidence, and request accurate instructions as to the effect of
each mass of evidence.
3I Cyc. 215.
16 Cyc. 928, et seq.
Although a plea in confession and avoidance at common law had to set
up matters which, if true, would constitute a complete defense, under the codes
mitigation is ordinarily available as a partial defense. See 31 CYc. 217.
206Wells v. Pike, 31 Mo. 59o (1862) ; Gillson v. Price, 18 Nev. iog, i Pac.
459 (I883).
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In every case, it is imperative that the plaintiff know exactly
his problem as to the amount of evidence necessary to establish
the respective elements of his case, and the amount necessary for
his adversary to meet it, for it is only in this way that he
can take full advantage of his privilege to invoke the ruling of
the court to successfully terminate the suit, and lay substantial
grounds for appeal, or protect himself on appeal by the defendant.
Much the same problems face the defendant if it is to avail itself
of the law during the course of the trial.
In Pennsylvania, where there is no presumption of negligence
at all, and where the presumption of origin is number one upon
certain combinations of circumstances, it is the defendant who
will most frequently have an opportunity to invoke a favorable
ruling from the court by taking advantage of the general pre-
sumption in his favor which puts upon the plaintiff at every state
of the lawsuit the burden of proof as to both origin and negli-
gence. As observed, however, both trial and appellate courts
are constantly reducing this advantage to the defendant in this
type of litigation, by relaxing the requirements upon the plaintiff
regarding his prima facie case, and thus, in fact, creating situa-
tions which practically amount to presumption number one on
both the question of negligence and of cause.
